Climategate

Introduction

Climategate caused intense commotion on the eve of the COP15 climate summit in Copenhagen November/December 2009. E-mail correspondence of climate scientists of the Climate Research Unit of the University of East Anglia in Great Britain were hacked and made available on a website accessible to the public. That correspondence showed, according to the skeptics, that scientific data supporting global warming was dealt with selectively and that certain studies that relativise the climate problem were deliberately left out of the report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Because of the tone and content of the hacked e-mails, as well as the discussions that started in early 2010 about found and alleged faults in parts of the most recent IPCC report, questions have risen about the scientific integrity, scrupulousness and political independence of the IPCC. Climate science was heavily criticised in the policy arena and in the media. Politicians demanded an evaluation of the work of the IPCC.The question was brought up of whether the IPCC had organised the production of its reports well, and to what degree the these scientific reports are politically tainted. Could their presentation of the knowledge be working in favour of the policy preferences of the involved researchers? Fifty-five Dutch scientists wrote an open letter to the Dutch Parliament indicating how science can contribute to improve the IPCC process, claiming that the IPCC should be more upright in quickly and openly recognising and correcting faults. At the same time, they emphasised that the faults do not take away from the main conclusion that humans are very likely changing climate, with considerable consequences for the future.

The international debate about the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and climate science in the aftermath of ‘Climategate’ gives cause for reflection. While the main emphasis lies on evaluating the procedures of the IPCC during the production of the fourth assessment report, too little attention has been paid to the political role of the IPCC. This article reflects on that political role by distinguishing three policy strategies to deal with scientific uncertainties: 1) more scientific research, 2) building scientific consensus, and 3) openness about scientific uncertainties. Each strategy has strengths and weaknesses. The way the international community has set up the IPCC and its procedures has basically been guided by the consensus approach. The current emphasis on restoring faith in the IPCC by improving its procedures reinforces this strategy. Guaranteeing the scientific reliability of IPCC reports is indeed essential but it does not address the main weakness of the consensus approach: the underexposure of both scientific and political dissent. As a result of this weakness climate science has become politicized over the last decades. Moreover, as we illustrate for the Netherlands, the consensus approach has hindered a full-blown political climate debate. The third policy strategy that aims for more openness and attention for diversity and uncertainty in knowledge and views may inspire more democratic ways to organize the interface between climate politics and science.
 

The issue of anthropogenic climate change is surrounded by much public, political and scientific debate. The laborious climate negotiations at COP15 in Copenhagen 2009 attest to this[1]. The emails hacked and made public (known in the media as ‘Climategate’) right before that climate summit and the unearthing of (alleged) faults in the fourth assessment report (AR4) [2,3,4] early 2010 have triggered vehement debate in science and society[5,6,7,8,9]. Questions have emerged with regard to the scientific quality and independence of the IPCC and the adequateness of the peer review process. Scientific institutions responded with independent evaluations of the contents of the hacked e-mails[10,11]. IPCC asked the InterAcademy Council (IAC) to evaluate their procedures. The political arena responded by demanding evaluation of the IPCC procedures during the production of AR4 [12,13]. From a policy perspective, guaranteeing the scientific reliability of the IPCC report is indeed extremely important. However, to adequately respond to the present ‘crisis’ broader societal reflection on - and reform of - the political role of the IPCC is also urgently needed.
 
To this end, we explore the complex interaction between climate politics and science [14,15,16,17]. For our analysis we introduce three political strategies to deal with scientific uncertainties and organize the relationship between politics and science. Next, we use this typology to interpret the role IPCC plays in the science-policy interface. We discuss the key function of IPCC as producer of “certified” scientific and policy-oriented knowledge in motivating and legitimizing (inter)national climate policy. We assess strengths and weaknesses of the current way in which the IPCC deals with a diversity of voices and uncertainties within climate science, and how these are presented to (policy makers in) the outside world. Finally, we look for ways to improve the interface between climate science and policy.
 
Three policy strategies to deal with scientific uncertainties
When policymakers are confronted with complex issues that are characterized by many scientific uncertainties three coping strategies may be distinguished [18,19,20].
 
Policy strategy 1: More scientific research
One can first see scientific uncertainty as a temporary shortcoming in knowledge. The related policy strategy is to quantify and push back the uncertainty by more research, e.g. creating increasingly complex climate models and through perturbed physics ensemble modelling [21,22]. This approach is limited by the fact that not all uncertainties can be expressed quantitatively in a reliable way. What’s more, in practice uncertainties do not become reduced with more research: the problem appears to become ever more complex [23]. The drawback of this approach is that there is a semblance of certainty, for example, because the numbers coming from the increasingly complex models suggest that there is more knowledge than is actually the case.
 
Policy strategy 2: Build scientific consensus
The second vision sees uncertainty as a problematic lack of unequivocalness. One scientist says this, the other says that. It is unclear who is right. The solution has been a comparative and independent evaluation of research results, aimed at building scientific consensus via multidisciplinary expert panels. This approach is geared towards generating robust findings. The drawbacks of this paradigm are that it leads to anchoring towards previously established consensus positions [24], it hides diversity of perspectives thereby unduly constraining decision-makers options [25], it underexposes issues over which there is no consensus whereas it is precisely this dissent which tends to be extremely relevant to policymaking [18].
 
Policy strategy 3: Openness about scientific uncertainty
Within a third approach uncertainty is seen as something which unavoidably plays a permanent role in complex and politically sensitive topics. This approach [26,19,27] recognizes that ignorance (lack of understanding of the complex climate system) and values play a central role. The search is for a robust policy, which is useful regardless of which of the diverging scientific interpretations of the knowledge is correct. The drawback of this approach is that uncertainty and minority interpretations are so much in the spotlight that we may forget the items that actually do enjoy broad scientific consensus (see [28,29,30,31] for accounts of the present scientific consensus and [32,33,34,35,36,37] for reviews of the state of knowledge).
 
Table 1 summarises the strengths and weaknesses of these strategies. The first two strategies are instances of the so-called linear or technocratic model [38]. In this linear model policymaking is based on a single scientific interpretation. Scientific facts (or in a weaker form, scientific consensus) are expected to form an unequivocal basis for policy-making. In a third policy strategy policies derive from ongoing and intense dialogues between a plurality of (sometimes diverging) scientific knowledges and a plurality of (often diverging) political values. This is known as the deliberative model.
 

 

 
Scientific uncertainty as …
Policy strategy
Strength
Weakness
1
Lack of knowledge
More scientific research
Searching for scientific certainties
Creating illusionary certainty
2
Lack of unequivocalness
Build scientific consensus
Exposing consensus
Underexposing dissent
3
Fact of life
Openness about uncertainties
Exposing dissent
Underexposing consensus

 

 
Table 1.           Overview of strengths and weaknesses of three policy strategies to deal with scientific uncertainties [18].
 
Strength of the IPCC consensus approach
The way in which international politics framed the IPCC when it was established in 1988 was mainly guided by the second policy strategy of with scientific uncertainties. To guarantee the policy relevance of the IPCC, politicians at that time opted for a consensus approach when dealing with scientific uncertainties.[1] In that period many contradictory studies about causes, effects, and seriousness of the climate change problem existed. Policymakers realized that they needed a clear policy-oriented knowledge base on which international climate policy could be based. To achieve that the IPCC was set up as an independent scientific panel by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) together with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). IPCC reports aim to identify the state of (chiefly peer-reviewed) knowledge while enjoying wide scientific support. This goal fosters developing consensus in the editorial teams. By mapping out scientific consensus, the IPCC fulfils a central political function in certifying robust knowledge that can serve as a foundation for climate policy.
 
Every 5 or 6 years the IPCC publishes a multi-volume assessment report presenting an overview of the state of knowledge. Each volume has a summary for policymakers, while a synthesis report summarises the findings of the whole report. Participating governments and scientists together determine the content of the policy summaries. Governments formally accept the reports of the IPCC. This procedure ensures that these reports can also count on wide support from governments and policymakers and are considered as an authoritative source. [39]
 
From the start, the work of IPCC has been strongly framed by its political context. Its first assessment report (1990[40]) served as the scientific basis under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that was signed in 1992. This put climate policy high on the national and international agenda. The main goal of UNFCCC – established in article 2 – is to stabilise concentrations of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. This level must be reached within such a sufficient time frame that ecosystems are allowed to adapt naturally to climate change, the food production is not threatened, and the economy can develop in a sustainable manner (read: is not disrupted by excessively interventionist climate policy).
 
The current tendency in the aftermath of "climate gate" and the unearthing of faults in AR4 is to improve IPCC procedures via external evaluations. This reinforces the consensus approach: people are looking for ways to continue with the existing practices and legitimise them politically. Although such a process is important, it is even more important to respond to the weaknesses of the consensus approach. In the following sections we reflect on its instrumental weaknesses and fundamental flaws.
 
Instrumental weakness of the IPCC consensus approach
The consensus approach deprives policy makers of a full view of the plurality of scientific opinions within and between the various scientific disciplines that study the climate problem. Partly, this results from the way in which scientific uncertainties are momentarily communicated. The IPCC’s own guideline prescribes that any diverging scientific visions on certain aspects should be reported in the chapters that discuss those aspects. This does get done. Yet policymakers’ summaries and synthesis reports do not provide insights into where in science is there dissent. To get a good picture of that one has to read the entire AR4. The current IPCC consensus model also causes weak signals from the scientific community of potentially large impacts to get a less prominent spot in the reports than they may deserve based on their policy relevance (see also [19]). This is the case with tipping points [41]: they can lead to severe non-linear impacts, but given the state of knowledge and the many uncertainties, univocal scientific consensus about the severity and scope of many of these tipping points cannot yet be reached. Still, such dissent is policy-relevant: when designing a policy strategy you better have thought beforehand about extreme scenarios that cannot be ruled out but have an unknown chance of happening than be completely surprised if they occur unexpectedly at a later time while early warnings from dissenting scientists were not heard (see also [42]).
 
Fundamental weakness of the IPCC consensus model: the case of the Netherlands [13]
For the Netherlands, the linear consensus model has "worked" for a long time: it provided a long-lasting broad political consensus about climate policy. On the negative side, the focus on consensus hindered a full-blown political climate debate which in turn has politicised climate science.
 
Analysis of parliamentary debates over the last twenty years [13] show that IPCC reports are continuously used to keep the political debate within bounds. Questions have repeatedly been asked in the Dutch Parliament about scientific information and scientific uncertainties surrounding the climate issue. These questions come from the entire political spectrum. The government consistently answers that scienti ic uncertainties do exist, but that policies are based on the IPCC reports and the precautionary principle. Because the political arena has given the IPCC reports such a central role, the political conflict about climate change and the underlying ideological contradictions have penetrated deep into the field of climate science. In other words, political influence nowadays can be achieved most effectively via climate science. With the IPCC reports in hand, proponents of the climate debate claim a preferential position in the debate. Opponents try to reopen the political debate by magnifying uncertainties and imperfections in climate science [43,44,45,46].
 
In the post-Climategate discussion the linear model has been harshly attacked, yet also strongly defended and upheld. To clean up the blemished blazon of the IPCC – that is, to restore the linear interaction model between climate politics and science – the Dutch government defended the linear model and ordered an independent evaluation of errors in AR4 [12].
 
In the United States where until recently the political climate debate was completely stuck the linear model has never worked [47]. More climate research and the consensus reports of the IPCC did not lead to less political conflict there. In the Netherlands the linear model has induced a scientification of the political climate debate because politics are dependent on scientific knowledge. In turn, science ends up at the heart of the political conflict, and when the stakes get high in political decisions, the scientific debate becomes politicised [48,49,50,51]. As a result, societal players deliberately start to deploy certain tactics to turn scientific results in their favour, to bring a favourable study to the fore, or to be rid of inconvenient knowledge [52,53,54,55].
 
Since the early 1990s, the IPCC has played a central political role. The scientific knowledge gathered and processed by the IPCC legitimizes domestic and international policy aimed at reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. Moreover, the long-term policy goals of the Framework Convention have become leading for the financing, organisation and any questions surrounding a large portion of climate science.
 
It is because of the central political role of the IPCC that precisely around the climate summit in Copenhagen (COP 15) the scientific debate flared up and became polarised. This political key role of science is the most important moving force behind politicisation of policy-oriented climate science. This partly explains why faults in a three-year-old scientific report are front-page news these days.
 
Epilogue: Towards a more democratic perspective
Given the intense criticism, repairing the technocratic model by evaluating the IPCC is a logical and good step to take. A good picture of the status of climate science is in fact an important precondition for prudent domestic and international climate policies.
 
Still, more is needed. To move beyond consensus the deliberative model offers a promising complementary approach to interface climate science and policy, based on openness about uncertainty, systematic reflection and argued choice. This remedies the basic weakness of the linear model that underexposes the scientific as well as the political dissent. It can fruitfully broaden the option space for decision making and enhance societies’ capacity to deal with uncertainties surrounding knowledge production and knowledge use in the management of climate risks. To this end, both the scientific and the political climate debate need more space and attention for diversity and uncertainty in knowledge and views. Consequently, it is necessary to make climate science less political. This can be accomplished by offering room for dissent within climate science and communicating about it with policymakers. An excessive dependence of science and policy should also be prevented. The political climate debate would benefit from clarification of the political values and visions that are at play in climate change. The climate debate could be expanded by paying attention to socially attractive development perspectives rather than doomsday scenarios only. The growing focus on climate adaptation also has the power to highlight and expand the political climate debate.
 
For a full analysis of the climate controversy see: Van der Sluijs JP, Van Est R, Riphagen M (Eds): Room for climate debate: perspectives on the interaction between climate politics, science and the media. The Hague, Rathenau Instituut; 2010.
 
References and recommended reading
* of special interest
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Brilliant analysis of amazingly effective deceitful tactics of industrial lobby groups disguised as independent scientist to discredit unwelcome knowledge and manufacture doubt and scientific uncertainty to safeguard profit and vested interests. Also check out ref 53 above which adds an illuminating typology that helps naming and recognizing these deceitful tactics.
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