Value-ladenness - the problematic distinction between facts and values

Value-ladenness refers to the notion that value orientations and biases of an analyst, an institute, a discipline or a culture can co-shape the way scientific questions are framed, data are selected, interpreted, and rejected, methodologies are devised, explanations are formulated and conclusions are formulated. Since theories are always underdetermined by observation, the analysts' biases will fill the epistemic gap which makes any assessment to a certain degree value-laden.

Numerous studies from the history and sociology of science have problematized the classic distinction between facts and values. Scientific facts and knowledge claims, especially when produced at the science-policy interface, have been shown to be at least partially socially constructed and co-shaped by implicit or explicit negotiation processes. Observation has been shown to be theory-laden and cognitive authority of science is ultimately produced by boundary work and negotiation. These contexts of knowledge production and use produce value-ladenness in knowledge claims (Jasanoff, 1990; van der Sluijs et al., 1998; Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Huesemann, 2002).

Kloprogge et al (in press) distinguish various types of value-ladenness of assumptions starting from the viewpoint of the analyst carrying out the assessment. In an earlier study (Kloprogge and van der Sluijs, 2002) it was shown that choices made by an analyst are affected by a range of factors. The choices of analysts are influenced by their knowledge, perspectives and situational factors. Arbitrariness can also play a role, in situations where the analyst has no reason to prefer one  particular assumption to another. Based on the nature of factors influencing the choice for a certain assumption, they distinguish four different types of value-ladenness of assumptions:

  • value-ladenness in a general epistemic sense (e.g., assumptions are coloured by the approach that the analyst prefers)
  • value-ladenness in a disciplinary-bound epistemic sense (e.g., assumptions are coloured by the discipline in which the analyst was educated),
  • value-ladenness in a socio-political sense (e.g., assumptions may be coloured by political preferences of the analyst),
  • value-ladenness in a practical sense (e.g., the analyst is forced to make simplifying assumptions due to time constraints).

At first sight it may look strange to include constraints having practical reasons in our typology of value-ladenness, but assumptions that are justified by a practical constraint can still lead to biased assessments as there is a potential to exploit references to such constraints to introduce assumptions that favour a politically desired outcome of an assessment. Also in case that there is no intentionality, practical constraints can introduce assumptions that lead to assessment results unduly favouring one position in a discourse over an other.

To systematically analyze potential value-ladenness, kloprogge et al. developed the pedigree matrix below that can be used to assess assumptions.

References
Kloprogge, P. J.P. van der Sluijs and A.C. Petersen (in press). A method for the analysis of assumptions in model-based environmental assessments, Environmental Modelling & Software.

Huesemann, M.H., 2002. The inherent biases in environmental research and their effects on public policy. Futures 34, 621–633

Jasanoff, S., 1990. The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Jasanoff, S., Wynne, B., 1998. Science and decisionmaking. In: Rayner, S., Malone, E.L. (Eds.), Human Choice and Climate Change. The Societal Framework, Vol. 1. Battelle Press, Columbus, OH, pp. 1–87.

Kloprogge, P., van der Sluijs, J.P., 2002. Choice processes in modelling In: Rizzoli, A.E., Jakeman, A.J. (Eds.), Integrated Assessment and Decision Support, Proceedings of the First Biennial Meeting of the International Environmental Modelling and Software Society. iEMSs, Manno, Switzerland, pp. 96–101.